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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that it is useful to model the decision to apply for disability benefits as a
special case of a more general dynamic retirement decision model. So doing, we then use a multistate, continuous-time hazard to test the effect of policy variables on the speed at which workers
apply for benefits following the onset of a work limitation. We find that policy variables matter.
A higher expected replacement rate increases the risk of application. This effect is found to be
significant in a small sample of the general population and in a sample which also includes a
weighted choice-based sample of disability insurance applicants.

MODELING APPLICATION FOR DISABILITY INSURANCE AS A
RETIREMENT DECISION: A HAZARD MODEL APPROACH
USING CHOICE-BASED SAMPLING
The rapid expansion of the Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiary population in
the 1970s caused concern that government policy was unduly encouraging workers to leave the
labor force. An even greater rise in the percentage of older men accepting early social security
retirement benefits during that period caused the same concern. These major reductions in labor
supply and the increases in government expenditures that resulted from them generated numerous
studies which attempted to measure the importance of social policy on these trends.
It is probably more an artifact of academic compartmentalization than a substantive
difference that has caused the literature of the last decade aimed at explaining the decision to
apply for disability benefits--see Leonard (1986) and Wolfe (1987) for reviews of this literature-to develop so distinctly from the even more burgeoning literature on the decision to accept an
employer pension or social security retirement benefit--see Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990)
for a recent review of this literature. Nonetheless, both literatures now recognize that such
decisions are motivated both by economic and health considerations. And each literature has
placed major emphasis on establishing the importance of social policy variables, especially social
security rules, on that decision.
In this paper, we begin with a standard model from the retirement literature and show that
it is a special case of a more general model which can also capture the effect of Social Security
Disability Insurance (DI) on the decision of workers to "retire" early. The major distinction
between the two models is that, unlike social security retirement benefits which are provided at
age 62 for all those who have a sufficient earnings record, acceptance onto the disability rolls
requires the worker to be judged unable to do any "substantial gainful activity." Hence, the risk
of being denied benefits and the consequences of being denied must be included in this more
general retirement model. Our model provides hypotheses concerning labor supply which we use
to test the speed at which employed workers who develop a health condition apply for DI
benefits.

2
In our empirical model, we explicitly argue that the application process for disability
benefits is a multi-period one in which the crucial decision is how long the application should be
postponed following the onset of a health condition. To capture this important dynamic aspect of
the application decision, we use a multi-state, continuous-time hazard model.
Below we present a theoretical model of the decision to apply for DI. Following this, we
develop an empirical hazard model. Next we discuss the data and issues of using a choice-based
sample. Then we discuss hypotheses and our empirical findings. This is followed by a brief
conclusion.

A Theoretical Model of Disability Insurance Application
The importance of DI on the decision by men with serious health conditions to leave the
labor force has been in dispute for over a decade. Parsons (1980), for instance, argues that older
workers are highly sensitive to the reward structure of the DI system relative to their market
earnings. Other researchers have found that the expected replacement rate of DI transfers
influences labor supply but to a much smaller degree. (See Haveman, de Jong, and Wolfe
[forthcoming] for a recent paper on this subject.) Perhaps most damaging to the view that DI
plays an important role in the retirement decision of health impaired men, is the finding by Bound
(1989) that under 30 percent of unsuccessful DI applicants were subsequently employed and that
only about two-fifths of the 30 percent worked full time.
The fact that most unsuccessful candidates never return to work does not mean, however,
that DI policy does not affect the decision to work. Substantial time may elapse between the
onset of a health condition, its first impact on work performance, and its subsequent influence on
job exit and application for disability benefits. Moreover, application for DI is in itself a risky
gamble in which the outcome can be delayed for years. Applicants for disability benefits must
"invest" in not being able to work to maximize their chances in what is often a long drawn out
review process.1 What Bound has found is that for most workers, the decision to apply for
benefits is tantamount to a decision to withdraw permanently from the labor market. But the size
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of disability benefits and the likelihood of receiving them may still be two policy levers which
importantly affect the point at which health-impaired workers take that gamble.
This empirical fact uncovered by Bound suggests that one can capture the effects of the
disability system on the decision to apply for disability benefits with a retirement model. For
simplicity, we assume an individual's decision to apply for DI is equivalent to deciding whether or
not to work. The impaired worker's problem is to choose the optimal age at which to apply for
benefits. In doing so, he must compare the utility from continued work against the weighted
utility of two alternative outcomes should he decide to apply for benefits: working zero hours
when the application is accepted or not working again even if his application is rejected.2
This variation of a dynamic optimal retirement age model will be applied to the timing of
the application for DI benefits. We assume a worker is initially employed at the onset of the
health condition and that the condition is exogenously determined. Our underlying theoretical
model is akin to the full information dynamic retirement models of Burbidge and Robb (1980) and
Mitchell and Fields (1984) which assume fixed labor hours over time and find the optimal
retirement age given an employer pension and social security. We use their basic assumptions
including a perfect capital market, but develop a more general model by introducing uncertainty
with respect to program acceptance.
Our key behavioral variable is time until application for DI. A person tries to find the
optimal time to transition from work to non-work under the assumption that he will not return to
work even if his DI application is rejected. Under the current DI system, one can only apply for
benefits before the age of 65 since DI benefits will "expire" or automatically convert to retirement
benefits after age 65.3
Consider an individual with a work horizon of T years. After the onset of a health
condition (t=0), this horizon is segmented at the year of DI application (R). Lifetime utility is
represented by:
R

V
0

e

t

U(Ct, L t)dt

T
R

e

t

EU(Ct, Lt)dt,

(1)
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where

is the discount rate, U(Ct, Lt) measures utility at time t prior to application, and EU(Ct,

Lt) measures expected utility at each time t following application. Since the health limitation
occurs at t=0, R measures duration until application, and T-R is the maximum period a person can
be on the beneficiary rolls.
We assume fixed leisure hours L0 denotes leisure when working and L1 denotes leisure
when not working. Equation (1) can be rewritten as:
R

V

e

t

0

T

U(Ct, L0)dt

R

e

t

[(p)U(Ct, L1)

(1

(2)

Equation (2) is the usual form of the time utility function except for the expected utility in the
second term. Expected utility in the second term of Equation 2 is a weighted average of two
possible outcomes, DI accepted or rejected, with the probability of having one's application
accepted being the weight. The probability of acceptance (p) is assumed to depend on the
person's health status as well as other socioeconomic variables and is assumed to be constant over
time. The individual's instantaneous time separable utility function is also assumed to be separable
in consumption and leisure, and the utility function has the form:
U(Ct, Lt)
where

[u(C t)

v(Lt)],

(3)

is the degree of good health with a value between 0 and 1. Higher values of

imply

better health.
The worker's problem is to choose Ct and the optimal time of application, R, in order to
maximize the discounted expected lifetime utility subject to his lifetime budget constraint:
Max V
Ct, R
R

s.t.

e

rt

0

A0

Wtdt
T

0

e

rt

p

T
R

e

rt

Bt(R, )dt

Ctdt

A0 is initial wealth; Wt is wage income before application; and Bt(R, ) is potential disability
benefits income with

as a parameter of the benefits formula.

(4)
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Since our main concern is R, we assume that

= r to simplify the model further. This

assumption implies that the individual chooses a constant level of consumption for his preapplication years, C0, and another constant level of consumption, C1, for his post-application
years. Because we have assumed an additive separable utility function over consumption and
leisure, C0 = C14.
The first-order conditions for an interior solution are the budget constraint and
C: uc

R: µ [e

µe (

rR

r)t

WR

µ

pe

(5)

rR

p (v(L1)

{

dBt 1 e r(T
(
dR
r

v(L0))e

R)

)

B t(R)}]
(6)

rR

,

where µ > 0 is constant. Condition (5) shows that the marginal utility of consumption is the same
as the marginal utility of wealth. Condition (6) shows that the marginal benefit of working one
more year equals the loss from not applying for disability benefits in the optimum age. The left
side is the gain from such a postponement expressed in terms of the marginal utility of
consumption weighted by the present value of the expected income stream, whereas, the right side
of this equation is the direct loss in discounted utility from further postponing application.
In the certainty case, the probability of acceptance, p, is equal to one, and we have the
Burbidge and Robb (1980) or Fields and Mitchell (1984) model as a special case of this
generalized model. Their comparative static results follow.
Under the simplifying assumption that a disabled worker applies for DI only once in his
lifetime, application duration (R), or the time until applying for DI, approximates lifetime labor
supply following the onset of a health condition. Thus, the usual testable hypotheses concerning
labor supply derived from a worker choice framework are implied for our duration variable. For
instance, application duration will be shorter, or the probability of application will increase: with
more initial wealth, higher expected disability benefits or a higher probability of acceptance into
the program, and with a decline in health.
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Empirical Hazard Model
The empirical model adopted here is a variant of the hazard model used by Diamond and
Hausman (1984) and Hausman and Wise (1984). Our hazard rate is the probability of applying
for DI conditional on an initial state of working, and the application decision is modelled as a
single transition process.
The probability that a person has applied for DI by age t is given by:
G(t)

1

t

exp[

h(u)du].

(7)

0

Associated with this distribution function is the density function:
g(t)

{1

(8)

G(t)} h(t).

The instantaneous hazard rate is the conditional probability of applying for DI at t, given that the
person has not applied before t. It is:
h(t)

g(t) / {1

(9)

G(t)}.

To make the distribution function G(t) a function of individual attributes, we specify the
hazard rate in the form:
h(t)

h1(X)

h2(t)

v.

(10)

The first term accounts for observable variation across individuals and is modelled as an
exponential function:
h1

exp (X´b).

(11)

The second component, h2(t), shows the time profile to application after the onset of a health
impairment once individual differences are held constant. In order to allow flexibility, we used the
quadratic form to capture time dependence:
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h2(t)

exp( t

t 2).

(12)

The third component captures unobserved individual heterogeneity. This heterogeneity may exist
because of omitted variables, uncertainty or differences in the distribution function across
individuals. If these differences are not controlled, then there may be spurious negative duration
dependence. We report our findings using a log normal distribution to control for unobserved
heterogeneity.
Since we know the beginning date of the spell, our measure of duration does not suffer
from left censoring. However, some spells are right censored. In this case we only know that the
true duration of the spell exceeds the observed final value, and hence, the duration is the length of
time until the end of the survey. For individuals who have still not applied for benefits at that
time, the probability of not applying for DI before period ti is:
1

Gi(ti

u).

(13)

For individuals who applied for the DI program, the year of application is known. The probability
of this event occurring between period tj and tj + sj is:
Gj(tj

s j)

Gj(tj).

(14)

Combining complete and incomplete spell components yields the following likelihood
function for the N1 impaired persons who have not applied and the N2 impaired persons who have
applied for DI:
N1
L

{1
i 1

N2
Gi(ti

u)}

{G j(tj
j 1

sj)

Gj(t j)}.

(15)
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Data
The most recent nationally representative economic-based data set containing information
on disabled workers is the 1978 Survey of Disability and Work.4 This survey of the prevalence of
work disabilities in the working age population was conducted by the Social Security
Administration. It contains two sampling frames. The first is a subsample of the Health Interview
Survey (HIS) and is representative of the general population of noninstitutionalized persons age
18-64. It contains data on 5652 persons. The second frame consists of 4207 persons who
applied for Social Security Disability benefits (SSA).
Each respondent was asked to identify any health conditions they had and when the main
health condition began. In this study, the time of onset is defined as the year when either the main
health condition began to bother the respondent or when the respondent first became aware of its
presence. Additional retrospective information on labor market activity including occupation,
industry, job change status, and household characteristics at the time each respondent's health
began to limit his ability to work is available. Information regarding application for DI is also
reported.
These survey data were matched with the social security earnings records for each
respondent. These data contain the yearly earnings of the worker since 1951 and the number of
quarters of coverage of social security covered employment since 1938.
Combining information from the 1978 Survey of Disability and Work with social security
earnings records allows us to trace an individual's economic behavior from the time his health
condition first starts until the date of application for DI.
In our empirical model, we analyzed the behavior of the male working age population, i.e.,
those under age 60 at the survey date and older than age 20 at the onset of their main health
condition. Our sample is further confined to those employed at the onset of their work limitation.
Those with missing information on either time of onset or date of application are excluded.5
As a result of this selection process, our sample consists of 1430 observations--348
observations from the HIS sample and 1082 observations from the SSA sample.
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Choice-Based Sampling
Due to the nature of a two-frame sampling approach, special attention must be paid in
selecting the study sample. The major questions of interest pursued by this study are as follows:
1.

Given the onset of a health condition, what determines the waiting time until a
disabled individual applies for DI?

2.

What factors associated with the potential population are important to the speed at
which application is made?

Since the SSA frame is composed of only DI applicants, application duration can be
calculated directly without censoring. However, using the SSA sample to answer this question
would give us biased results because the dependent variable is time until application for disability
benefits and, by definition, the SSA frame oversampled early applicants since it included only
applicants. The sample proportions inconsistently estimate the corresponding population
proportions. Manski and Lerman (1977) showed that treating choice-based samples as if they
were random and calculating estimators appropriate to random samples yields inconsistent
estimates. They introduced a weighted likelihood function which can generate consistent
estimates.6
To obtain consistent estimators, one can use the total sample with an estimator corrected
for choice-based sampling. By merging the two frames, a larger sample with a more
heterogeneous distribution of health condition severity is obtained. Each observation's
contribution to the log-likelihood is weighted by P(j)/S(j), where P(j) is the probability (density)
of a person with the characteristics of person j and S(j) is the sample probability (density) of a
person with the characteristics of person j. This is defined based on the sample design (over
sampling or undersampling certain people) and the population of applicants. These weights are
available from the 1978 Survey. However, 75 persons, 22 percent of the HIS sample, appeared in
the SSA sample. They are not identified in the SSA Sample. For these persons, adjusted weights
are calculated. Let the weight for each sample be
Ws = pr(x population) / pr(x SSA sample)

10
Wh = pr(x population) / pr(x HIS sample).
Then weight Wb for those who are listed in both samples is calculated as follows:
1
1/Ws

1/Wh

Ws.

(16)

The first part is the correct total weight for these persons, and since they appeared twice in the
sample, the already assigned weight, Ws, should be deducted from the correct weight. Ws for
these persons is not identified in the survey. The mean value of the weight for the SSA sample is
assigned in the calculation.
Variables Affecting Job Duration
The explanatory variables in h1(x) in equation (10) are defined in Table 1. They include
economic and health status variables used in equation (4), as well as control variables.
Replacement Rate
The Social Security Disability Insurance replacement rate is the key variable in most
economic-based studies of the decision to apply for DI benefits. The greater the share of wage
income that can be replaced by DI benefits, the more likely a worker is to apply. Currently, to
receive DI benefits a worker must have sufficient quarters of coverage to be eligible for the
program. And he must be unable to perform any substantial gainful activity. Roughly, the test is
that a worker must have a physical or mental impairment that has prohibited him from working for
five months and will make it unlikely that he can work for at least one year.

TABLE 1
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES
Variables

Definitions

Replacement Rate

(expected PIA)/AMW

Savings

equals 1 if a worker had savings at onset of a work limitation, otherwise 0.

Experience

quarters of coverage in all covered employment prior to work limitation.

Accommodation

equals 1 if at onset of work limitation the employer provided help to respondent to
remain on the job, otherwise 0.

Age at Onset

Age at onset, years.

Married at Onset

equals 1 if married, otherwise 0.

Nonwhite

equals 1 if nonwhite, otherwise 0.

Education

Years of formal education.

White-Collar

equals 1 if the occupation at onset is professional or managerial, otherwise 0.

Physical Demand

Estimated summary scores of selected occupation characteristics.

Strength

From DOT, matched for the 591 occupational categories in the 1970 Census.

Functional Limitation

equals 1 if respondent had a functional problem in performing a task on his job,
otherwise 0.

Comorbidity

equals 1 if a respondent had multiple health conditions at onset, otherwise 0.

Cardiovascular

equals 1 if the main health condition is in the cardiovascular disease group, otherwise
0.

Musculoskeletal

equals 1 if the main health condition is in the musculoskeletal disease group,
otherwise 0.
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We use the same method developed by other researchers (for instance: Leonard, 1979;
Halpern and Hausman, 1986; and Bound, 1989) to calculate individual replacement rates. We
first use the social security formula appropriate in the year of health condition onset to calculate a
worker's Average Monthly Wage (AMW) and his Primary Insurance Amount (PIA). We then
explicitly recognize that there is some degree of uncertainty related to acceptance onto the DI
rolls by estimating a probit model of DI acceptance from a subsample of DI applicants. For the
HIS frame, we can only use DI applicants. An expected benefit is calculated for each worker by
multiplying this value by the worker's PIA adjusted for dependents.
Because we can only use those workers who actually applied for benefits in obtaining our
probability of acceptance measure, we may have a selection problem. By using a bivariate probit
model with a selection correction, we are able to check for this possibility. This was done and we
found no significant selection bias in our sample. A detailed discussion of this work is available in
Appendix B which will be supplied by the authors upon request.
Our measure of a worker's replacement rate is the expected value of his DI monthly
benefit divided by his AMW at the time of onset of his health condition. We follow the work of
others in interpreting the AMW as a measure of the worker's permanent wage.
Wealth
We would like to hold wealth constant in our model. Unfortunately, little information is
available on this variable at the point of onset of a health condition. We approximate this value by
the use of a binary variable that is positive if the worker had savings at onset.
Accommodation
Most economic models of DI application ignore the importance of an employer's behavior
on this outcome. Yet the willingness of an employer to adjust the workplace to compensate for
an employee's work limitation may play an important role in allowing the worker to continue on
his job. This is certainly the belief of those who supported recent legislation which requires
employers to accommodate disabled workers. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled workers as long as
these accommodations do not create an undue hardship on the operation of business. Our pre-
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ADA data allow us to capture the effect of accommodation on DI application. A variable reports
whether an employer did anything to accommodate the worker when his health condition first
began to affect his ability to do his job. We expect accommodation to reduce the risk of applying
for DI.
Experience
We expect a worker with more experience in the job market to have greater human capital
and, hence, to be slower to apply for benefits.
Other Socioeconomic Variables
Age at Onset, Marital Status at Onset, Race, and Education are also included in our
empirical model. Marital status, higher education, younger age, and non-black race are generally
found to increase work effort, and hence, we expect them to reduce the risk of application.
Job Characteristics
Several researchers have looked at the importance of job attributes on the decision of
workers to retire. We report our finding using a binary variable to distinguish white-collar
workers, but we also used more elaborate job attribute measures developed by Roos and Treiman
(1980) from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. These measures were used by the Social
Security Administration in their, report Social Security Administration (1986). We expect that an
impaired worker in a more physically demanding job has a higher risk of applying for DI benefits.
Health Measures
Finally, we attempt to account for variations in health within our sample by use of a
function limitation variable as well as by accounting for comorbidity to see if different types of
health conditions influence duration. We choose the two most common physical conditions
among the DI population, cardiovascular and musculoskeletal conditions, and a measure of
multiple conditions. We expect that those suffering from functional limitations or from multiple
conditions are more likely to apply for DI benefits than less impaired workers.
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Results
A univariate interval hazard technique was used to estimate the model. The results are
presented in Table 2. In the first equation we use the HIS sample. The second equation combines
the HIS sample with the SSA sample, controlling for choice-based sampling. The results are very
similar, and not surprisingly, the t-values are higher in the larger sample. In both equations, we
allow for unmeasured heterogeneity and assume that it follows a log normal distribution.
Consistent with previous research on the decision to apply for DI benefits, we find that a
higher expected replacement rate increases the risk of application after the onset of a work
limiting condition. This finding differs from previous studies since it measures the speed to
application, but it is similar in its support of the hypothesis that this policy variable affects the
application decision even of the health impaired. Our wealth variable also significantly increases
application risk as predicted by our model.
Only our study of DI application attempts to control for an employer's willingness to
accommodate a worker who becomes impaired. We find that those workers who are
accommodated apply for DI benefits less quickly. In contrast, we find overall experience in the
work force has no significant effect on job exit.
Of the other socioeconomic effects in the equation, older workers were more likely to
apply for DI benefits, as were the less educated and whites. Marital status at onset was not
significant.
Occupation related variables representing physically demanding jobs also have an
insignificant effect. This was true whether our measure was a simple binary variable indicating a
white-collar job, as shown here, or more sophisticated scales of physical characteristics required
by occupation. This is a somewhat surprising finding, and it may be that the variation within these
classification schemes is greater than across classifications.
Those with functional limitations were more likely to apply for benefits. This is an
important finding since it shows that the severity of the limitation is an important predictor of

TABLE 2
ESTIMATED HAZARD OF APPLICATION FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY INSURANCE
HIS Sample
(n=348)
Explanatory Variables
Constant
Replacement Rate

Combined Sample
(n=1430)

Coefficients

t-Value

Coefficients

t-Value

-4.33*

-4.17

-1.51*

-3.27

4.01*

4.99

4.49*

9.90

0.02**

2.50

Had Savings

-0.02

-0.01

Experience

-0.02

-.04

0.03

1.80

Accommodation

-0.77*

-2.91

-0.66*

-5.94

Age at Onset

0.04**

2.06

0.02*

2.74

Married at Onset

0.29

1.14

0.03

0.29

Nonwhite

0.13

0.44

-0.44*

-2.60

Education

-0.01

-0.31

-0.07*

-6.80

White-Collar

-0.33

-0.89

0.14

1.30

2.14

0.39

4.48

-0.07

-0.28

-0.06

-0.07

Cardiovascular

0.30

0.87

0.17

1.57

Musculoskeletal

-0.63**

-2.43

-1.11*

-9.08

Time

-0.27*

-3.72

-0.17*

-4.33

Function Problem
Comorbidity

0.50**

Time Squared

0.01*

4.13*

0.01*

4.57

Sigma Squared

0.91

0.97

0.91

1.79

*

Significant at 1 percent.
Significant at 5 percent.

**
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application even in a sample in which everyone has a job-impairing health condition. Hence, the
variation in health is less than in most other studies of disability. Comorbidity was not significant,
but it may be a poor proxy for severity of health.
The coefficients of time in Table 2 capture time dependence controlled for observed and
unobserved heterogeneity. In both equations negative time dependence is found. The average
person in the sample applies for benefits after 7.7 years. The risk of application falls for 12.8
years. Thus, the risk falls for most people for most of the relevant period.
Conclusion
Bound (1989) has shown that the decision to apply for Social Security Disability Insurance
benefits is in effect a decision to retire early for most health-impaired workers, since even those
who are eventually denied benefits rarely return to work. As we show, however, this does not
mean that the decision to work is unaffected by DI policy variables. Using a dynamic optimal
retirement age model we show that the size of DI benefits and the likelihood of receiving them
should affect the speed at which health-impaired workers apply for such benefits and effectively
retire from the work force. Using a univariate interval hazard technique, we show that the
expected replacement rate significantly affects the timing of application, as do other economic
variables, including whether the worker had savings and whether his employer provided
accommodation on the job.
Our findings suggest not only that public policy has influenced the speed at which healthimpaired individuals apply for DI benefits but that it can slow down as well as increase the
decision to do so. If a goal of disability policy is to encourage health-impaired workers to stay in
the work force, our results suggest that the timing of that intervention is important. It should
occur prior to application for benefits. Bound's findings show that return to work is unlikely once
a worker has gone through the DI process. Our work suggests that a lower expected replacement
rate will delay applications but so will greater accommodation on the job. Both policy tools
influence workers' plans while these plans are still in the formative stage and, hence, are more
likely to have an impact on subsequent work.
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APPENDIX A
Acceptance Model with Return to Work Assumed
if Benefits Are Denied
Consider an individual with a horizon of T years. Assume that since the onset of a health
condition (t=0), a physically or mentally impaired individual's lifetime can be divided into two
segments, one in which the individual has not applied for DI and one in which the individual has
applied. Then lifetime utility may be represented by
R

V

e

t

0

where

U(Ct, L t)dt

T

e

t

EU(Ct, Lt)dt,

R

(A-1)

is the discount rate, U(Ct, Lt) is the utility at time t before applying, and EU(Ct, Lt) is the

expected utility at time t from applying for DI. R is the time of application for DI, and T is the
end of the lifetime. If we assume that the health limitation occurs at t=0, then R4 is also
interpreted as duration until application, and T-R is the period during which a person expects to
be on the beneficiary rolls if he applies and is accepted. Following Halpern and Hausman (1985),
our model assumes that when a worker's application is rejected, he will return to work.
We assume fixed labor hours. L0 denotes leisure when working, and L1 denotes leisure
when not working. Then equation (A-1) can be rewritten as:
R

V
0

e

t

U(Ct, L0)dt

T
R

e

t

[(1 p)U(Ct, L0)

pU(

(A-2)

Equation (A-2) is the usual form of lifetime utility function except for the expected utility in the
second term. It shows that the expected utility is obtained as a weighted average of two possible
utility paths, defined by the application for disability being accepted or rejected, with the
probability of having one's application accepted being the weight. Basically this assumes that the
only uncertainty involved is that the applicant does not know whether he will be accepted. The
probability of acceptance (p) is assumed to depend on the person's health status as well as other
socioeconomic variables and is considered to be constant over time. The individual's
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instantaneous time separable utility function is also assumed to be separable in consumption and
leisure, and the utility function has the form:
U(Ct, Lt)
where

[u(C t)

v(Lt)],

(A-3)

is the degree of good health or the inverse of severity of a health condition, with a value

between 0 and 1. A higher number on this parameter implies a better health status, and it is
assumed to be constant. By rewriting, we get equation (A-4):
R

V

t

e

[u(Ct)

0

v(L0)]dt
(A-4)

T

t

e

[(1 p){u(Ct)

R

v(L0)}

p{u(C t)

v(L

The worker's problem is to choose Ct and the optimal time of application, R, in order to maximize
the discounted value of lifetime utility subject to his lifetime budget constraint:
MaxV
C t ,R
R

s.t.

e

0

(1 p)

rt

(1 z)Wtdt
T

R

and Wt

e

rt

T

p

e

rt

R

(1 z)Wt dt

A0

Bt(R, )dt
T
0

e

rt

(A-5)
C tdt
(A-6)

Wt.

A0 is initial wealth, z is the proportional payroll tax rate on earnings, Wt is wage income
before application, Bt(R, ) is potential disability benefits income with

as a parameter of the

benefits formula, and Wt is the new lower-wage income encountered when the worker tries to
reenter the labor market after the application is denied. Assume that

= r to simplify the model

further. This assumption implies that the individual chooses a constant level of consumption for
his pre-application years, C0, and another level of consumption, C1, for his post-application years.
Due to the assumption of an additively separable utility function over consumption and leisure, C0
= C1.
The first-order conditions for an interior solution are the budget constraint and
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µe (

R: µ[e

rR
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µ

(A-7)

(1 z){WR

p (v(L1)

(1 p)WR}
v(L0))e

pe

rR

dBt 1 e r(T
(
dR
r

R)

)
(A-8)

rR

where µ > 0 is constant. These first-order conditions can be interpreted as follows. Condition
(A-7) says the marginal utility of consumption is the same as the marginal utility of wealth.
Condition (A-8) shows that the marginal benefit should be equal to the marginal cost of working,
i.e., postponing application for one more year at the optimum. The left side is the gain from such
postponement expressed in terms of the marginal utility of consumption weighted by the present
value of expected income streams, whereas the right side of this equation is the direct loss in
discounted utility from further postponement of applying. At the margin, these gains and losses
are balanced out.
Comparative Static Results
A total differentiation of the first-order conditions of the system yields the following:
ucc

0

0

µK1
(1

e

rT

)/r

p (v1

1
p (v1
v0)/µ

v0)/µ
0

d
0
p(v1
0

0
v0 )

0

0

0 K2 K3
µ K4 K5

dA 0
d
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dµ
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where v1 = v(L1), v0 = v(L0). Let J be the determinant of the 3 x 3 matrix on the left side.
Given diminishing marginal utility of consumption, i.e., ucc < 0, and K1 is negative as assumed in
Burbidge and Robb (1980), J

will be positive, and the second-order conditions for the

problem will be met. Since our main concern is effects on the time of application, we will focus
on effects of various factors on R only.
For a change in health status, , we obtain:
dR
d

1 1 e
{
J
r

rT

p (v1

v0)} > 0

(A-9)

That is, a decline in health would reduce the application duration R and, hence, speed up DI
application.
In case of a change in initial wealth, A0, we obtain:
dR
dA0

p (v1 v0)
1
{ucc
}<0
J
µ

(A-10)

Suppose that the benefits formula includes a parameter , which can result in a change in benefits
structures. Then for a change in , assuming that the shift in disability benefits induced by a
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change in

did not alter the rate at which disability benefits change with the age of retirement

( B2 / R

= 0), we obtain:
dR
d

1
[{ucc
J

p (v1

v0)

µ

K4}

{

1

e
r

rT

(A-11)

K2}] < 0

since K4 < 0 and K2 < 0. In these circumstances, an increase in

reduces the age of application

or raises the risk of application.
Finally, in case of a change in the probability of successful claim, p, we obtain:
p (v1 v0)
1
[ucc K5
J
µ

dR
dp

1 e
r

rT

(A-12)

K3 ]

Note that K3 > 0 from the first-order condition. Then as long as [ B

(1

z) W R in K5 is

positive (or at least a small negative so that the terms in brackets in (1A-2) remain negative),
(A-12) is negative. That is, if DI benefits are greater than, or at least less than by a small amount,
the post-application wage income, then a higher likelihood of acceptance to the disability program
would speed up application for DI.
Allowing the Decision to Return to Work
to be a Choice Variable
If an applicant is rejected, then he has to decide whether to return to work by comparing
the post-application wage with the shadow wage. The following is a sketch of a generalized
model that introduces this possibility formally.
The worker's problem is to choose Ct and the optimal time of application, R, in order to
maximize the discounted value of lifetime utility subject to his lifetime budget constraint:
R

V
0

e

T

t

U(Ct, L0)dt

0

e

t

[(1 p) U(Ct, L0)

pU(

(A-13)
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(1 p)
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C tdt

(A-15)

Wt

where A0 is initial wealth, z is the proportional payroll tax rate on earnings, Wt is the wage income
before application, Bt(R, ) is the potential disability benefits income with

as a parameter of the

benefits formula, and Wt is the new lower-wage income encountered when the applicant tries to
return to the labor market after the application is denied.
Now let us introduce another uncertainty and let q be the probability of returning to the
labor market after one's application is denied. By including this component, we have
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T

t

U(Ct, L0)dt
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[(1 p)q U(Ct, L0)
(A-16)

(1 p) (1 q) U(Ct, L1)
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(1 p)q
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(1 z)Wt dt
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e

rt

C tdt

Wt

(A-18)

This is a more generalized model. Our model presented in the appendix above is a special
case for a value of q=1. On the other hand, if we assume q=0, i.e., no return to work after denial
of a DI claim, as we did in the paper, uncertainty in the utility function disappears and we have a
certainty model except for the second term in the budget constraint.
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APPENDIX B
Calculation of the Expected Replacement Rate
We follow Leonard (1979) in our calculation of expected disability benefits. We first
determine if a worker is eligible for benefits based on his years of tenure, then we compute his
potential benefits using information from his past earnings history. Then using a subsample of
recent applicants from the 1978 Survey of Disability and Work, we impute the probability of
acceptance using a univariate probit model. We then calculate an expected benefit by multiplying
these two variables.
Rules for calculating Average Monthly Wage (AMW) and Primary Insurance Amount
(PIA) vary over the period of our analysis. Since we are interested in the expected replacement
rate in the year that a worker first experienced a work limiting health condition, we used the rules
in that year to estimate AMW and PIA based on the worker's earning history to that point. In
general, we calculated a worker's AMW by first summing his yearly social security earning
beginning at age 21 (or in 1951 for those older than 21 in 1951) and ending in the year his health
condition first began to affect his work and then dividing that sum by the number of months in the
benefit computation years. After calculating the AMW, we used the formula appropriate for the
onset year to estimate PIA.
In order to calculate expected disability benefits for the workers in our HIS sample, it was
necessary to estimate their probability of acceptance into the DI program. This probability was
estimated using a standard univariate probit equation. However, in our estimation we only use
those HIS sample members who applied for DI. Hence, our calculation may be subject to
selectivity bias. In the disability literature that is based on cross-sectional research, it is assumed
that there is no selectivity bias in the sample, i.e., that the sample of actual applicants used to
estimate the equation does not differ from the population of applicants and nonapplicants
(Leonard, 1979; Hausman, 1985; Halpern and Hausman, 1985, 1986). The rationale for this
assumption, as suggested by Halpern and Hausman (1986), is that the statutory and actual criteria
used by the Social Security Administration involve observable characteristics that can be
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quantified in both applicants and nonapplicants. While we used the univariate probit equation
from our HIS sample in our analysis, we also estimated a model of DI application and acceptance
which permitted us to test for selectivity.
Testing For Selection
To test for possible selection, a simultaneous equations system was used. The dependent
variables in our model--application for DI and acceptance into DI--are binary variables; so we
tested a bivariate model with sample selection. Formally we have the following equation systems:
Y1

= Xa + e1

(B-1)

Y2

= Zb + g (P * Replacement Rate) + e2

(B-2)

Yj

= 1 if Yj > 0 and 0 otherwise, j = 1, 2.

(B-3)

Here ej follows N (0, 1) with

equal to the correlation between e1 and e2. Y2 is the unobserved

index for a propensity of application, P is the probability of acceptance (i.e., the probability that
Y1 is greater than zero), and Y1 is observed only when Y2 = 1. As suggested above, the
expected replacement rate term is included in the equation for the DI application decision and is
calculated by multiplying the replacement rate by the probability of acceptance, which can be
imputed from equation (B-1)--(P * replacement rate).
This is a selectivity model in which estimation of the coefficient (a) using only DI applicants
yields inconsistent estimates if the correlation between the two error terms, e1 and e2, is not equal
to zero. The LIMDEP program package provides a full information maximum likelihood
estimation method to solve the problem.
As an approximation, Heckman's two-step selectivity correction procedure (Heckman,
1979) may also be used to correct for this potential bias. One main difference between the
Heckman procedure and ours is that the dependent variable in the selected sample (Y) is binary
while it is continuous in Heckman's example. Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) showed how the
Heckman procedure can be applied to the bivariate probit situation.
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There exists yet another difficulty in estimating the above equation system. Since the
probability of acceptance into DI, P, included in equation (B-2) is not observed, we must use a
proxy in our estimation. Two alternative proxies were tried. First, the probability of acceptance
equation was run using only DI applicants and assuming the absence of selectivity. An alternative
proxy measure was estimated based on the assumption that the probability of acceptance is
initially one for everyone in the HIS sample. In other words, a bivariate probit model with sample
selectivity was run to estimate the coefficients for the acceptance equation by assuming that the P
term used to calculate the expected replacement rate in the application equation is equal to one.
Table B-1 shows, for the HIS sample, two estimated probability of acceptance equations as an
intermediate step in estimating P. These estimated coefficients were then used to calculate the
predicted values of the probability of acceptance for the whole sample of both applicants and
nonapplicants. Using these proxies, a bivariate probit model was then estimated controlling for
selectivity.
The first two columns in Table B-2 show the bivariate probit estimation results based on the
two alternative proxies using the HIS sample. The third column shows the result of a simple
univariate probit estimation of the probability of acceptance equation using the SSA sample for
which no adjustment is required since it only includes those who applied for DI. While the result
of the acceptance equation of the SSA sample and that of the HIS sample are considerably
different, the results from the HIS sample based on the two alternative measures of instrumental
variables are only slightly different. What is important for our work, however, is that using either
proxy the correlation between the error terms in the two equations is not significantly different
from zero. Hence, selectivity does not play an important role in the HIS sample.

TABLE B-1
PROBIT MODEL FOR PROBABILITY OF ACCEPTANCE:
FIRST STAGE TO OBTAIN P
Alternative I
(n=181)
Explanatory Variables

Alternative II
(n=348)

Coefficients

t-value

Coefficients

-0.601

-0.786

0.051

-0.057

Age at Onset

0.015

0.870

0.006

0.309

Married at Onset

0.676*

2.658

0.619**

2.178

Constant

t-value

Nonwhite

-0.056

-0.218

-0.098

-0.384

Had Savings

-0.189

-0.896

-0.162

-0.736

Education

0.018

0.591

0.027

0.955

Experience

0.002

0.513

0.003

0.584

Comorbidity

-0.381

-1.506

-0.365

-1.332

Function Problem

0.156

0.743

0.075

0.341

Cardiovascular

0.133

0.425

0.088

0.290

Musculoskeletal

-0.590**

-2.196

-0.406

-1.276

Pulmonary

-0.468

-0.978

-0.431

-0.903

Psychiatric

0.236

0.526

0.225

0.579

Log-Likelihood

-105.7

-317.5

*

Significant at 1 percent.
Significant at 5 percent.

**

Alternative I:

univariate probit model based on only HIS applicant sample with assumption of no selectivity.

Alternative II:

bivariate probit model with selection based on entire HIS sample with the assumption that the
probability of acceptance is 1. The probability of application portion from the simultaneous
system is not reported.

TABLE B-2
PROBIT MODEL OF PROBABILITY OF ACCEPTANCE
HIS (n=348)
Bivariate Probit with Selection
I

SSA (n=1082)
Univariate Probit

II

III

Probability of Acceptance
Variables
Constant
Age at Onset

Coefficients

t-Value

Coefficients

t-Value

Coefficients

t-Value

-0.846

-0.89

- 0.693

-0.84

0.853

2.58

0.019

0.90

0.017

0.85

0.001

0.04

**

**

0.704

2.49

0.693

2.45

0.056

0.47

Nonwhite

-0.051

-0.19

-0.059

-0.22

0.091

0.03

Had Savings

-0.203

-0.89

-0.197

-0.86

0.068

0.66

Education

0.015

0.47

0.017

0.58

0.001

0.03

Experience

0.002

0.49

0.003

0.53

0.002

0.80

-0.392

-1.34

-0.398

-1.30

0.029

0.26

Function Problem

0.180

0.79

0.162

0.73

-0.041

-0.42

Cardiovascular

0.139

0.43

0.131

0.41

0.172

1.20

Married at Onset

Comorbidity

**

**

Musculoskeletal

-0.654

-2.06

-0.617

-2.12

-0.252

-2.00

Pulmonary

-0.488

-0.98

-0.490

-0.97

0.196

0.94

Psychiatric

0.235

0.57

0.232

0.55

-0.057

0.28

Probability of Application
Constant
Exp. Replacement Rate
Age at Onset

**

-2.22

-2.610*

-2.69

*

5.68

*

6.034

10.48

**

2.36

0.028

1.58

-1.424

2.341
0.030

*

Married at Onset

0.255

1.29

0.802

3.02

Nonwhite

0.151

0.73

0.109

0.47

Had Savings

-0.045

-0.28

-0.069

-0.32

Education

-0.023

-0.89

-0.019

-0.54

Experience

-0.003

-0.74

-0.004

-0.91

Help

-0.536*

-3.24

-0.507**

-2.48

White-Collar

-0.245

-0.96

-0.329

-0.78

Comorbidity

0.106

0.61

0.167

0.66

Function Problem

0.257*

1.63

0.366

1.79

Cardiovascular

0.050

0.19

-0.046

-0.13

Musculoskeletal
Rho (1, 2)
Log-Likelihood

*

*

-0.464

-2.64

-0.591

-2.62

0.172

0.39

0.076

0.29

-304.4

-238.8

-434.5
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Calculation of Job Characteristics
When Congress passed the Social Security Amendments of 1983 increasing the social
security retirement age beginning after the turn of the century, it mandated a study of the
implications for workers in physically demanding jobs. To fulfill this mandate, the Social Security
Administration had to determine appropriate criteria for identifying physically demanding jobs.
Since the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) was the only available systematic source of
data for classifying occupations according to the degree of physical demands, three criteria based
on DOT were developed in their report (Social Security Administration 1986). The DOT uses 44
job characteristics to evaluate occupations and, based on job descriptions, scores for each
characteristic are assigned to occupations. These characteristics measure complexity of functions,
training and education, aptitudes, temperaments, interests, physical demands, and working
conditions. The three measures chosen by the Social Security Administration were: the strength
variable in the physical demand characteristics group, a multiple-item scale variable composed of
characteristics representing physical demands based on statistical analysis, and a composite
strength measure based on stoop and climb variables. In its final report to the Congress, the
narrow strength variable was used. The strength measure has the virtues of clarity of meaning,
appropriateness, and simplicity combined with some detail in scoring: 1-to-5 scale reflecting
sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy work. However, two potential drawbacks of this
variable are that the variation in jobs within classifications may overwhelm the variation across
classifications and that the job classification based on a single variable is too narrow. Hence, we
use this measure with our HIS sample but also include a second measure.
The second alternative examined by the Social Security Administration was a multiple-item
scale based on the work of Roos and Treiman (1980). They estimated summary scores of
selected DOT characteristics for the 591 occupational categories in the 1970 Census. To do this,
they averaged DOT scores for all individuals in each category with weights proportional to the
number of individuals holding each DOT occupation. As a first step, they present these scores for
each of eight occupational characteristics in the fourth edition of DOT: DATA, PEOPLE,
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THINGS, GED (general educational development), SVP (specific vocational preparation),
STRENGTH, PHYSDEM (physical demands), and ENVIRON (environmental condition). Since
the DOT worker function and worker trait variables are highly intercorrelated, they develop four
multiple-item scales of the major underlying dimensions using factor analysis: substantive
complexity, motor skills, physical demands, and undesirable working conditions. One of these,
the composite physical demands scale includes: EYEHAND (aptitude), CLIMB (physical
demand), STOOP (physical demand), LOCATION (working condition), and HAZARDS
(working condition). This composite characteristics measure has a 0-10 range (the lowest-scoring
occupation is coded zero). For instance, the score of physical demands is 0.1 for economists and
8.7 for firemen. Note that the resulting scale does not include the strength, prime physical
demands characteristic. Equal weights were assigned for all of the included characteristics
arbitrarily. We also calculated this multi-item scale for all our HIS sample workers.
The strength/stoop/climb composite, the third alternative, is a useful complement to the
strength variable. However, it is not a preferred substitute, since it adds some complexity but it
does not add much new information. In fact, the Social Security Administration chose the simple
strength measure as the best measure for physically demanding jobs in its final report to Congress
(Social Security Administration 1986). We did not use this scale.
Since occupations in the 1978 Survey of Disability and Work are coded on the basis of the
1970 Census classification system, the imputed scores developed by Roos and Treiman (1980)
can be directly converted to our sample. We call the simple straight variable Physical Demands in
our analysis. We call the multiple-item scale Strength. Our binary variable which separates
professional and managerial positions from other occupations we call White-Collar.
We report our finding using the White-Collar variable in the text. It was found not to affect
duration significantly. In alternative equations using the other two variables, we found similar
results. In addition, we found that the use of the other two measures of job characteristics had no
effect on the significance of other variables.
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Endnotes
1.

See Weaver (1986) for a discussion of the DI determination and appeals process.

2.

A more complex model would allow for the possibility that an unsuccessful applicant
would return to the labor market. Halpern and Hausman (1986) develop such a model. In
appendix A, available upon request, we show the comparative statics of such a model in
which a worker's expected wage falls after unsuccessful application and he must decide
whether or not to return to work.

3.

See Haveman, Wolfe, and Warlick (1986) for a model of this decision. In fact, a disabled
person aged 62 to 65 has three options; working, DI application, or early retirement. For
those age groups, the decision to apply for DI can be intertwined with the usual retirement
decision.

4.

For technical details, see Bye and Schechter (1982).

5.

Some respondents made multiple applications for the program. The questionnaire asked
only the date of the last application. If we use only the first applicant sample, there may
be a selectivity problem. Fortunately, our interval hazard estimation technique allows us
to use all applications. The time of the first application, which is the one we analyze, must
be before the last application, and thus, an interval from zero to the time of the last
application includes the time of the first application.

6.

See also Manski and McFadden (1981), Hausman and Wise (1981), and Heckman and
Robb (1985).
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